Listen to the full episode, here.
Key Points
- There was a massive, consistent decline in U.S. manufacturing jobs as a percentage of the total workforce over the past 50 years, falling from 22% in 1975 to under 8% today. [02:55]
- This decline was not a recent phenomenon tied to specific trade deals but a steady, decades-long trend. [04:24]
- Norris argued that technology and automation have been more responsible for the loss of manufacturing jobs than globalization or competition from China. [07:43]
- The hardest-hit sectors included apparel and textiles, which lost nearly 85% of its jobs, and computer and electrical products, which lost almost half. [05:33]
- The political rhetoric about bringing back manufacturing jobs was largely based on nostalgia and appealed to disenfranchised voters, ignoring the reality that many of these jobs were physically demanding and undesirable. [18:15]
- Modern manufacturing jobs are no longer low-skill positions; they require significant technical training to operate advanced machinery.
- The future of American manufacturing was predicted to be in specialized, high-margin, niche products that leverage technology, rather than in the mass production of low-margin goods. [22:05]
John Norris (00:30):
Well, hello again, everybody. This is John Norris with Trading Perspectives. As always, we have our good friend, Sam Clement. Sam, say hello.
Sam Clement (00:35):
Hey, John. How are you doing?
John Norris (00:36):
Sam, I’m doing fantastically. I hope you are.
Sam Clement (00:38):
I’m doing great.
John Norris (00:39):
Glad to hear that. The only thing I’m not exactly sure about is whether all those people in the manufacturing sector are doing great.
Sam Clement (00:45):
Why is that?
John Norris (00:46):
Well, everything the administration has said it wants to do with these tariffs to bring manufacturing jobs back—at least that’s one of the goals—
Sam Clement (00:55):
Right. That’s been a core sentiment of this administration. When you talk about “making America great again,” that’s a feeling people have—those middle-class jobs coming back.
John Norris (01:10):
We kind of wax nostalgic about a life that may never have fully existed—or maybe it did—when manufacturing was a much larger part of the U.S. economy and accounted for more jobs.
(01:23)
The thinking goes, “Hey, if we get more people working in factories, that’s good for the U.S. economy.” Never mind that we’ve grown significantly over the last 40 years even as we’ve lost manufacturing jobs. The truth is, Sam, when I look at the data—numbers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Federal Reserve, plus a little spreadsheet work of my own—here’s what I found.
At the end of 1975—December 1975, about 50 years ago—there were 78,017,000 payroll jobs in the U.S. In the manufacturing sector as a whole, including bosses, assistants, and support staff, there were 17,140,000 jobs, or about 22% of the workforce. Of those, about 12,811,000 were production workers—people actually getting their hands dirty—which was about 16.4% of the workforce.
Sam Clement (02:47):
It’s getting nerdy, but I’m following you.
John Norris (02:48):
It is, but stick with me. Manufacturing accounted for 22% overall; production workers made up 16.4%. Those are the key numbers to remember. Fast forward to August 2025—the U.S. economy now has 159,540,000 payroll jobs. Of those, 7.97% are in manufacturing, or 12,722,000 jobs. Production workers make up 8,857,000, about 5.6% overall. So, roughly four to four-and-a-half million production and manufacturing jobs have been lost. That’s a massive decline both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the workforce.
Sam Clement (03:49):
What’s amazing to me—since you actually made a spreadsheet—
John Norris (03:52):
I did!
Sam Clement (03:54):
If you’d put that into a line graph, it would be almost a perfect downward slope.
John Norris (04:02):
Exactly.
Sam Clement (04:04):
Across 50 years of data, there are only two brief upticks: 1975–76, from 21.97% to 22.03%, and once in the early 2010s, from 8.83% to 8.85%. Otherwise, it’s down every year for 48 of the past 50. This isn’t a new trend. It’s not just the result of the 1990s trade agreements or China. Whether trade was free or restricted, it’s been one direction—down.
John Norris (04:57):
One direction—down. I pulled other data to see where the job losses have been worst. Durable goods manufacturing, wood products, nonmetallic minerals, and fabricated metals are all down around 35% in employment. Computer and electrical products are down 47%. And that pales compared to apparel and textiles—
Sam Clement (05:57):
Which, as a state, we know all too well.
John Norris (05:58):
Exactly. Apparel and textiles have been hit hardest. In June 1979, there were 2,194,000 jobs in that sector. By June 2019, there were just 334,000.
Sam Clement (06:31):
Decimated.
John Norris (06:31):
Completely—an 85% decline, or roughly six out of seven jobs gone. Paper products are down about 48% too. It’s been broad-based, though some industries have been hit harder than others. And you have to ask, why?
Sam Clement (07:00):
In our state especially, that sentiment rings true. There are plenty of cities that were built on textiles—
John Norris (07:16):
Like Pittsburgh—
Sam Clement (07:18):
Or even within our own state.
John Norris (07:20):
Go through the Carolinas—you’ll find whole mill towns without mills. Many of the biggest job losses are in industries that could be more easily automated. I’ve been in a textile factory—it’s almost fully automated now. Technology has caused more job losses in manufacturing than China, in my opinion.
Sam Clement (08:21):
It’s close, but globalization overall has played a big role. Labor costs in emerging markets are still dramatically cheaper. You see products made in Brazil, packaged in Thailand, sold in the U.S.—
John Norris (08:53):
Designed in the U.S.
Sam Clement (08:55):
Exactly. It seems inefficient, but the labor savings make it worthwhile to ship materials across oceans multiple times.
John Norris (09:16):
Right. In sectors where labor costs are a high percentage of total costs, emerging markets have a clear advantage. But in sectors where technology is the main driver, the U.S. can compete. We don’t need to be the cheapest—we just need to be more productive than others are cheap. That requires investment in technology and better training. But the more technology we use, the fewer workers we need.
Sam Clement (10:25):
And you don’t even have to match labor efficiency per unit. Post-COVID, companies realized that supply chain reliability and proximity matter. Many are willing to pay more for onshore production to avoid shutdowns and delays.
John Norris (11:07):
Let’s hope that continues. The next question is—does the U.S. even want these jobs back? Manufacturing can be tough, dirty, and physically demanding work. Many people worked those jobs so their kids wouldn’t have to.
Sam Clement (12:27):
I think the sentiment about wanting these jobs back is just that—a sentiment.
John Norris (12:36):
Waxing nostalgic?
Sam Clement (12:38):
A little. People remember when one income could support a family, but they forget how much the standard of living has changed—fewer trips, fewer appliances, one car. We’ve traded up in quality of life.
John Norris (13:22):
Exactly. As Billy Joel said, “The good old days weren’t always good, and tomorrow’s not as bad as it seems.” Manufacturing nostalgia overlooks that. Don’t get me wrong, I’d love for us to produce more here and control our supply chains. But most people probably don’t want to go back to working in those mills.
Sam Clement (14:42):
Right. In many of these towns, the industry left and nothing replaced it. So it’s understandable that people long for those jobs—they remember when the local economy worked.
John Norris (15:31):
Exactly. When the mill leaves, it’s not just the factory jobs that go—it’s the cafes, law firms, and local shops. Some towns recover; others don’t.
Sam Clement (18:15):
Not every city has a nice lake to attract new industry.
John Norris (18:15):
True. That’s why politicians emphasize factory jobs—they’re tangible, visible, and employ semi-skilled labor. But factory jobs today require far more technical skill. The days of dropping out of school and walking into a mill job are gone.
Sam Clement (19:15):
Clearly not at the same scale.
John Norris (19:41):
Right. Politicians play on nostalgia—it sells. It appeals to disenfranchised voters.
Sam Clement (19:46):
And it works. We’ve seen it in elections—voters who hadn’t turned out before are now influencing outcomes.
John Norris (20:15):
Exactly. So, what’s the future of manufacturing employment in the U.S.?
Sam Clement (20:27):
That long-term decline from 22% to 8% probably won’t reverse. Our economy keeps growing, so even if manufacturing jobs stabilize, the percentage will still shrink. The sectors most likely to grow are those tied to national security—pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, defense-related products—where reliance on foreign suppliers has proven risky.
John Norris (21:27):
That’s true. I think we’ve stabilized job losses since the last major recession. We hover around 8–9 million production jobs depending on the cycle. As a share of total employment, that continues to decline, but the number of workers seems steady.
Looking forward, I think U.S. manufacturing will shift toward specialized, high-margin, lower-volume products. Technology—like 3D printing—will enable faster delivery of custom goods. We won’t bring back low-margin textile jobs, but we’ll see growth in advanced manufacturing.
(23:32)
Manufacturing still makes up about 10% of U.S. output—around $2.5 trillion—which is larger than most countries’ entire economies. It’s still huge and growing, just with fewer workers.
Alright, guys, thank you all so much for listening. We always love hearing from you. If you have any comments or questions, please let us know at or leave a review on your favorite podcast app.
If you’d like to read more of our thoughts, visit oakworth.com under the Thought Leadership tab for previous Trading Perspectives episodes, our Common Cents blog, quarterly Macro & Market Perspectives, and other insights from our Advisory Services Group led by Mac Frasier and the Oakworth team.
John Norris (24:31):
Sam, anything else today?
Sam Clement (24:34):
That’s all I’ve got.
John Norris (24:34):
That’s all I’ve got too. Y’all take care.
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